ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
ccording to the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC, 2006b, p. ii), ethical conduct is a harbinger of successful business: "We do business with those we trust; we get business from those who trust us. … Ethics, therefore, is a driver of business growth ..." There is virtual unanimity, though, that this cornerstone of business excellence has been repeatedly challenged by high profile business failures (Ponemon, 1995; Leung and Cooper, 2005) , scandals of epic proportions (Waddock, 2005 ; Young and Annisette, 2009), perceptions of severe market competition (Jackson, Wood and Zboja, 2013), and, not least, trenchant globalization. In turn, concerns have spawned over the moral education of practicing accountants (Ponemon, 1990; IFAC (2009) that are thought to be pivotal for enriching a firm's ethical climate, and it is the initiatives, directives and oversight mostly of the CFO that enable these two structural dimensions to unfold in the firm. This section, therefore, is in three parts. The first part briefly discusses the role of corporate governance mechanisms and codes of conduct, or best practice, from an institutional perspective; the second part discusses the linkage of ethical climate and corporate governance mechanisms; and the third part addresses the important moderating role of environmental uncertainty given its assumed impact on an organization's ethical climate.
Control Mechanisms Embedded in Corporate Governance
With the burgeoning global business scandals over the past several decades, international accounting institutions have responded in several ways to influence the professional conduct of accountants in practice and, perhaps more indirectly, the organization's ethical climate. In 2003, for instance, the IFAC issued a research document entitled Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting -An International Perspective. Not surprisingly, recommendations based on organizational weaknesses called for more effective corporate ethics codes in addition to the provision of training and support for individuals within organizations. Subsequently, the IFAC/CIMA (2004) commissioned a research project to solicit the perceptions of professional accounting bodies on "ethical issues facing the profession, the causes of ethical failure and the role of ethics education" (Jackling et al., 2007, p. 929) . The findings revealed overwhelming support for more ethics education via accounting curriculums and continuing professional development, prompting the conclusion that to improve the ethical climate in organizations "… the professional bodies are best placed…" (Jackling et al., 2007, p. 941 ).
The singular focus on education, however, fails to acknowledge control systems embedded in corporate governance structures as important antecedents of an organization's ethical climate -a position supported by the theoretical ethics literature as well as by pronouncements from accounting institutions with a global reach, such as the IFAC. In a study integrating individual ethics and ethical climate, Elango, Paul, Kundu and Paudel (2010, p. 543) opined that "The findings call for creating governance mechanisms to enhance ethical congruence, thereby increasing the likelihood of managers making ethical choices …" Moreover, the IFAC issued a "best practices" guideline -Evaluating and Improving Governance in Organizations -to the international accounting community in 2009. In spirit, this guideline was directed at an organization's governing body; however, the professional accountant in practice was specifically implicated throughout because "… activities, in which the professional accountant in business is engaged, are strongly aligned with the activities included in the definition of governance …" (IFAC, 2009, p. 6) . These activities are manifested in ex ante and ex post control systems, performance measurement systems under generally accepted accounting principles, systems for managing internal control and risk, and systems aimed at drivers of value -all of which constitute structural phenomena in organization theory (Tymon et al., 1998) . Moreover, the inextricable linkage between ethics and governance is clearly articulated by the IFAC (2009, p. 6): "IFAC's (2006a) Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants … underpins the role of professional accountants in business in evaluating and improving governance in organizations …" Unfortunately, this conveyance does not specify how governance structures can enhance ethics in an organization, nor does it offer any empirical evidence.
2006 exposure draft of the IFAC's Proposed Good Practice Guidance: Defining and Developing an Effective Code of Conduct. In the introduction, the draft (2006b, p. iii) states, "The PAIB Committee … published a document in 2004 entitled Enterprise Governance -Getting the Balance Right. The document emphasized that Enterprise Governance includes two dimensions -conformance with rules and organizational performance. Underpinning these is the need to adhere to high standards of ethical conduct." The draft continues (2006b, par. 1.10) "As … a CFO, an accountant may be directly involved … by taking a leadership role … and establishing the structures and approach required to execute an ethics, compliance, and values program." Moreover, codes of conduct and governance mechanisms "… play a vital role in strengthening the control environment, within which professional accountants can feature significantly by monitoring, reviewing, and reporting on performance" (IFAC, 2006b, par. 1.13). For these reasons, the conformance and performance dimensions of corporate governance served as the conceptual anchor in the present study for empirically measuring the independent variables that influence an organization's ethical climate.
Ethical Climate in Organizations
There is general agreement in the ethics literature that ethical climate is a component of organizational culture and, therefore, using the two concepts interchangeably can be confusing because they have different ontological origins. So, when embarking on any discussion of ethics, the initial tendency is to consider only individuals and avoid reifying entities such as corporations; but as Jackson et al., (2013, p. 233) point out, "… individuals do not operate in a vacuum. The organizational culture and context serve to shape or at least influence the ethical decision-making process of the individual." It is well-accepted that organizational culture shapes the organization's ethical climate in the form of corporate values (Ferrell, Gresham and Fraedrich, 1989; Hunt, Wood and Chonko, 1989) , provides a social context (Trevino, 1986) , and establishes an ethical framework (Mascarenhas, 1995) .
However, the present focus is not on the larger concept of organizational culture but, rather, it is on context -the determinants of an organization's ethical climate from a control system (i.e., governance) perspective. Prior research by Sinclair (1993) and Wimbush, Shepard and Markham (1997) acknowledge that one prime factor that influences ethical behavior of employees is the ethical climate of the organization. The importance of ethical climate is also promoted by Jackson et al. (2013, p. 241 ) who cite Andreoli and Lefkowitz (2009): "… an organization's ethical climate is as critical in shaping behavior of those in a corporation as is a corporate code of ethics." The fundamental point is that organizational design features (Robertson and Anderson, 1993) , which include all financial and non-financial control systems that fall under the rubric of corporate governance, may well affect ethical climate and, ultimately, the ethical behavior of a firm's members. Victor and Cullen (1987; 1988) are responsible for initially developing a two-dimensional model of ethical climates, with one dimension comprised of three ethical criteria derived from systems of "egoism", "benevolence", and "abstract principle" based on the work of Kohlberg (1984) , Fritzche and Becker (1984) and Williams (1985) . The second dimension, locus of analysis, builds on the sociology literature (Gouldner, 1957; Merton, 1957) which argues that ethical systems "may be applied to individuals, the organization, or society at large" (Cullen, et al., 1989, p. 54) . Viewed as emergent control systems, ethical climates are "…multidetermined by societal norms", or the environment in which the organization functions; "organizational form", such as centralization or decentralization; and "firm-specific factors", most notably a firm's history (Victor and Cullen, 1988 , p. 119).
Perhaps their most crucial empirical finding about ethical climate is that "… organizations did not have single climate types" (Victor and Cullen, 1988, p. 105) , thus signifying that ethical climate is a multidimensional construct. Even so, they defined ethical climate as "… the shared perception of what is ethically correct behavior and how ethical issues should be handled …" (Victor and Cullen, 1987 , pp. 51-52). Dickson et al. (2001, p. 204) suggest that this definition is widely accepted in the ethics literature and remind us that it "is not focused on 'what is right or wrong' but rather focuses on the things that organization members perceive the organization to see as ethical." In substance, this parallels Schneider's (1975) definition which stresses the paramount role of perceptions by members inside the organization, and not the views of external constituents. In terms of every day functioning, ethical climate relates to the way accountability, responsibility, regulations, communication, equity, trust, and the welfare of stakeholders are handled -and it is control systems and related routines that substantiate this domain.
Several scholars have revisited the Victor and Cullen (1988) framework to describe antecedents of climate regarding ethics that include social norms, organization form, and firm-specific factors (Dickson et al., 2001; Grojean, Resick, Dickson, and Smith, 2004) , with the conclusion that the only significant empirical research revolves around firm-specific factors -in particular, organizational leadership. Dickson et al. (2001, p. 208) argue that "the critical determinant of the climate regarding ethics is leader behavior" [italics in original]. They believe that establishing a strong ethical climate is the best way to capture the desired behavior of organizational members. This transpires when " leaders explicitly attend to their own values, determine the values that they wish to instill in organizational members, and make strategic organizational decisions that will facilitate the development of shared perceptions of appropriate ethical behavior" (Dickson et al., 2001, p. 198) .
These unfold through several mechanisms, including the role model image, enacting reward and punishment systems for specific types of behavior (Trevino, 1986) , and adopting particular policies, structures, and operating systems. All these factors become implicated when the action repertoire of corporate governance mechanisms put forth by the IFAC (2009), for instance, are enacted by the firm's CFO, if not the CEO. An assumption in the present paper is that CFOs are an integral part of strategic leadership along with CEOs (Boal and Hooijberg, 2000) and are instrumental in the design of control systems. Grojean et al. (2004, p. 233) nicely summarize literature specifying how this plays out: "Strategic leaders focus on broad policies and objectives (Barnard, 1938) , planning and controlling (Page and Tornow, 1987) and provide a strategic vision that unifies the organization and provides a plan for the future (Smidt, 1998) ." This unification is all about ethical climate and it entails the establishment of structures, processes, and control systems that are both forward-looking and historically-oriented (Zaccaro, 1996 ; House and Aditya, 1997; Ireland and Hitt, 1999), which precisely parallel the performance and conformance dimensions of corporate governance specified by the IFAC (2009).
Although the brief conceptual overview presented above suggests a direct relationship between an organization's ethical climate and the integrity of its formal control mechanisms, such a linkage does not appear to have been examined empirically in the business ethics literature, and certainly not with respect to the directives found in the IFAC (2009) pronouncement on best practices. Systematic reviews in the field of accounting ethics (Bernardi, To recap, the IFAC has generated several international documents involving best practice guidelines that present an efficacious case for (1) the existence of a balanced repertoire of governance routines dealing with conformance and performance systems within the firm and (2) the necessary presence and improvement of these control systems to amplify an organization's cultural values and ethical climate as part of good corporate governance. Following arguments and discussion in the ethics literature, control systems of the type advocated by the IFAC seem to be central, if not indispensable, to enhancing ethical climate. Given the intersection of both of these literatures, the following research hypothesis is tested:
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H1:
Higher levels of conformance and performance mechanisms in the firm positively influence ethical climate.
The Role of Environmental Uncertainty
Literature addressing the impact of an organization's external environment on its ethical climate is scarce. Dickson et al. (2001) address the issue of climate internalization in stable versus unstable environments. They suggest that certainty brings about ethical behavior since expectations are known and followed without any deviation, whereas conditions of instability or unpredictability create more variance in ethical behavior due to a lack of precedence or the sheer novelty of the situation. However, uncertainty can also be manifested in the form of competitive economic factors (Rajeev, 2012 ) that influence ethical behavior in the firm. For instance, price competitiveness and product quality can alter expectations and pressure firms to respond in unethical ways, mostly due to longer term uncertainties. Shleifer (2004) developed five examples of market competition, ranging from employment of children to corporate earnings manipulation, to illustrate the consequences of these economic factors on unethical behavior. In a study of sales forces, Robertson and Anderson (1993) (1998) identify four elements that characterize the role of PEU as a strategic construct: the external environment is the source of uncertainty, lack of knowledge about the interaction between external and internal processes means the external environment is shrouded in uncertainty, it is the de facto perceptions of these external elements that influence strategic decision-making in the context of altering the organization's control system structure, and the relevant perceptions about the environmental uncertainty facing the firm emanate from top managers, such as CEOs and CFOs, thus fixing the strategic orientation at the pinnacle of the organization.
However, there are concerns in the literature about how the PEU construct should be operationalized. Much of the accounting research literature views it as a unidimensional construct (Sharma, 2002) whereas organizational theory researchers recognize PEU as a multi-dimensional construct (Milliken, 1987; Gerloff, Muir and Bodensteiner, 1991; Sharfman and Dean, 1991) . Studies that adopted Duncan's (1972) measure have been criticized because of confounding internal and external environmental referents in the scale. To avoid this concern, Tymon et al. (1998) recommend utilizing either of the scales developed by Khandwalla (1972) or Miles and Snow (1978) which incorporate only external environmental referents. Khandwalla's (1972) measure requires responses on the intensity of competition pertaining to five external referents (i.e., the competitiveness of prices, promotion, distribution, product quality, and product variety) which are deemed to be essential to the correct operationalization of the PEU construct. Several empirical studies have successfully used this PEU construct to examine management controls (Khandwalla, 1972) , information system characteristics (Gordon and Narayanan, 1984) , and managerial performance (Gul, 1991; Gul and Chia, 1994) at the organization level. Given the stance in the ethics literature on the presumed negative impact of uncertainty, higher levels of PEU should provide a weaker link between corporate governance mechanisms and ethical climate. Therefore, the second hypothesis tested is:
H2:
When PEU is low, the relationship specified in Hypothesis H1 is significantly stronger than when PEU is high.
Data were obtained from a survey questionnaire directed at CFOs/controllers of Canadian companies. These top-level managers were randomly chosen from the membership directory of the Society of Management Accountants of Canada. The survey instrument was web-based and part of a larger, ongoing research project involving Canadian-based companies. All companies retained in the sample had more than 200 employees, and this filter provided some degree of control over the size of firms in the sample. Respondents were cross-referenced to the Society's Registry to confirm active membership and designation. This boundary condition ensured that participants in the study had been exposed to the ethical knowledge and codes of professional conduct endorsed by the Society. These executives were targeted because of their overall knowledge of their firms' control systems, their interactive role in developing and implementing various governance mechanisms, and the assumed role of ethical leadership within their respective firms. The entire questionnaire was pilot-tested successfully to assess its length, understandability, and general attractiveness, as well as to ensure that minimum levels of reliability and validity could be attached to all measurement scales.
In total, 563 responses were received, but they were subjected to several filters. As mentioned above, firms with less than 200 employees were eliminated since their governance structures may not reflect those of larger companies nor manifest the same dynamic of leadership and organizational ethical climate. 2 This reduced the eligible firms to 374. In addition, a tenure requirement of four years was invoked so as to ensure some degree of experience, expertise and responsibility in the role of leading the accounting function in the firm. Finally, utility and non-profit organizations were excluded for reasons of non-homogeneity following other management accounting research studies (e.g. Chenhall and Brownell, 1988; Brownell and Dunk, 1991) . These two filters reduced the sample to 154 usable responses, of which 24 were incomplete and six indicated no variance. Removing these responses left a usable sample of 124 firms. Response bias was assessed following the procedures recommended by Armstrong and Overton (1977) . The sample initially was split into two groups of approximately equal size based on the response date. The means and standard deviations of the measured variables were then compared for significant differences in the two sub-samples. This procedure manifested no evidence of response bias.
Measures

Independent Variables
The performance and conformance measures of corporate governance originally developed by Williams and Seaman (2010) were utilized in determining the independent variables for this study. Each dimension was measured by three scales that virtually map the corresponding guidelines overarching both dimensions that were identified by the IFAC (2009). The three scales in the conformance dimension covered accountability in the reporting function, providing assurances of ethical conduct and managing conflicts of interest, and assessments of the effectiveness of risk oversight. The purpose of using these three scales was to reflect the more historic or 'backward-looking' aspects of the ex post control systems subsumed in an organization's corporate governance structure. A more forward-looking set of scales in the performance dimension captured the ex-ante features incorporated in an organization's corporate governance structure. These were intended to reflect the accountant's role in the control processes dealing with strategy implementation and evaluation, external and internal communication processes, and value creation as specified by the IFAC (2009). Items for all six scales were rated on a fully anchored Likert scale ranging from 1 (to a very little extent) to 5 (to a very great extent). An average score was then calculated for each scale to represent the independent variable under investigation.
Turning to the conformance dimension first, the variable "accountability" (C1) was developed from a threeitem scale which yielded a single factor (eigenvalue of 2.52) that explained 80 percent of the total variance. Similarly, the two variables -"assurance" (C2) and "risk" (C3) -emerged as single factors from factor analyses (eigenvalues of 1.96 and 1.90) of two-item scales that explained 95 percent and 92 percent of the total variance, respectively. In addition, Cronbach's (1951) alpha statistic was calculated for each of the three scales yielding reliability coefficients of 0.81, 0.94, and 0.91, respectively. Focusing on the performance dimension, the variable "strategy" (P1) was formed from a three-item scale that yielded a single factor (eigenvalue of 2.58) and explained 85 percent of the total variance. The "communication" (P2) variable was likewise generated by a three-item scale that yielded one factor (eigenvalue of 2.21) accounting for 76 percent of the total variance. The variable "value creation" (P3) was also formed by a three-item scale which produced one factor (eigenvalue of 2.14) explaining 72 percent of the total variance. Finally, calculated reliability coefficients based on Cronbach's alpha statistic were 0.92, 0.81, and 0.80, respectively.
For each of the six independent variables, the emergence of eigenvalues greater than unity confirmed the single factor structure of each scale. Although more variance is explained in the set of compliance scales versus the performance scales, the calculated eigenvalues support the convergent validity in each set of scales. Moreover, the alpha coefficients range from 0.80 to 0.94 overall, with little difference between the conformance and performance variables. In fact, these coefficients are very strong for purposes of regression analysis and they more than satisfy Nunnally's (1967) inter-item reliability standard for exploratory behavioral research.
Dependent Variable
Measuring an organization's ethical climate is somewhat problematic and, arguably, rests on the nature of the research questions that are being addressed. Cullen et al. (1989) acknowledge that ethical climate is simply one component of organizational culture and, moreover, make it clear that organizations do not have single types of ethical climate. They initially approached the problem of measuring ethical climate by constructing nine possible theoretical types based on a three-by-three matrix (Victor and Cullen, 1988) . Following Kohlberg (1984) , Victor and Cullen (1988) show three types of ethical criteria on the vertical axis: egoism, benevolence, and principle. The horizontal axis lists three levels of analysis: individual, local (group or organization), and cosmopolitan (society at large). Hence, theoretically, ethical climate may focus on any one or a combination of nine factors as shown in Table 1 : "self-interest, company profit, efficiency, friendship, team interest, social responsibility, personal morality, rules and standard operating procedures, or laws and professional codes" (Cullen et al., 1989, p. 55).
Factor analysis to determine what factors actually exist in practice has produced equivocal results. For example, Victor and Cullen (1988) produced five factors, with three of them containing multiple combinations of the nine theoretical factors (see italics in Table 1 ). Wimbush and Shepard (1997), using a modified instrument, also produced five factors but one was different from Victor and Cullen's set while laws and rules were combined. Moreover, the ranking of the factors in terms of average scores was not isomorphic across these two studies and it was not possible to ascertain what percentage of the total variance was explained in the retained factors from the factor analysis. The point here is that both studies were examining dimensions of ethical climate in different subunits at multiple levels of analysis, in different firms, and across different industries.
The objective in this paper was to create a composite measure of ethical climate that is representative of CFO perceptions at the firm level and not at the sub-unit, group, nor individual level per se. 3 As Victor and Cullen (1988, p. 119) advised, "… the climates … for groups within organizations are defined primarily in terms of the fundamental ethical criteria described. Only within the principle criterion, however, did the loci of analysis define different climate types. This suggests that, unlike climates emphasizing egoism or benevolence criteria for decisionmaking, ethical climates based on the use of principles or rules have an organization-relative focus generated by the individual, the organization, or by other systems such as the law" (emphasis added). Thus, the ethical criterion of egoism was eliminated from this study 4 , leaving the shaded cells in Table 1 as the primary focus. With this qualification in mind, and with the explicit exclusion in this study of an individual or group focus, ethical climate was measured using 16 items adapted from the instruments used by Victor and Cullen (1988) and Schminke, Ambrose and Neubaum (2005). Factor analysis using a principal components procedure with Varimax rotation yielded three usable scales. All items were rated on a fully anchored Likert scale ranging from 1 (to a very little extent) to 5 (to a very great extent). 
Instrumental
Company Profit
Instrumental
Efficiency
Caring
Benevolence Friendship
Caring
Team Interest
Caring
Social Responsibility
Caring
Principle
Personal Morality
Independence
Company Rules and Procedures
Rules
Laws and Professional Codes
Law and Code
Adapted from Simha and Cullen (2011). Bold italics denote empirical dimensions. Shaded cells depict the focus of the present study.
The first scale, labeled "compliance and accountability", contained three items: (1) people value respect at all levels of the organization, (2) the organization ensures compliance with laws and regulations, and (3) the organization holds me accountable for my decisions. The single-factor structure of the scale was confirmed by factor analysis. One significant factor emerged with an eigenvalue of 2.39, which explained 79.5 percent of the total variation. This factor simulates the combined "rules" and "law and code" factors empirically derived by Cullen (1987, 1988) . The second scale, called "social accountability", also contained three items: (1) time is spent in this organization on ethics training, (2) the organization devotes sufficient resources to conducting a social audit, and (3) the organization spends time reporting the social audit to the public. Again, factor analysis yielded one significant factor with an eigenvalue of 2.42, which explained 80.6 percent of the total variance. Notably, this factor strongly parallels the "caring" factor empirically derived by Cullen (1987, 1988) . Finally, the third scale, designated "firm integrity", was comprised of three items: (1) people value honesty at all levels of the organization, (2) people value trustworthiness at all levels of the organization, and (3) top management models ethical behavior. One significant factor resulted from factor analysis with an eigenvalue of 2.17, which explained 72.2 percent of the total variance. This factor also closely matches the "caring" factor empirically derived by Cullen (1987, 1988) . Cronbach alpha coefficients of 0.70, 0.87 and 0.85, respectively, confirmed the reliability of the scales. Finally, an average score was calculated for each of the three scales which were then summed and averaged to generate the dependent variable for each firm in the regression model.
Moderating Variable
PEU was measured using an adapted version of the competitive pressure scale originally developed by Khandwalla (1972) , which Tymon et al. (1998) asserted is the only one that clearly measures perceived uncertainty of the external environment. Respondents were asked for their assessment of the intensity of competition on a fully anchored Likert scale ranging from 1 (far below average intensity) to 5 (far above average intensity) pertaining to five dimensions in the external environment: raw materials, technical personnel, selling and distribution, quality and variety of products, and price. 5 This scale was preferred over others because arguments from the literature on ethical climate noted earlier appear to single out competitive economic factors as potentially influencing an organization's ethical climate but failed to mention the effects of factors such as turbulence and technology. A simple average of the responses to these five items was used as the measure of PEU. For this study, the scale achieved a Cronbach alpha coefficient of 0.68, only marginally acceptable by behavioral research standards. By comparison, Sharma (2002) obtained an alpha statistic of 0.57 for similar PEU items, Gul (1991) reported 0.77, and Gul and Chia (1994) achieved a value of 0.73. Given the broad-based nature of the sample obtained in the present study, encompassing a large geographic region, tapping multiple industries, and enveloping heterogeneous competitive factors, the reliability of the PEU measure for this study was deemed acceptable. Finally, the PEU scores for all firms were dichotomized at the mean of the distribution to create two categorical variables for testing
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Analysis
To investigate H1, which involves the impact of the conformance and performance dimensions of corporate governance on ethical climate, a multiple regression model of the following form was utilized:
where EC = ethical climate, P1 = strategy, P2 = value creation, P3 = communication, C1 = accountability, C2 = assurance, and C3 = risk. A significant finding would supply evidence of main effects of the conformance and performance dimensions on ethical climate and thus, statistically, the research hypothesis H1 would be accepted. To test H2, Eq. (1) was re-run for both the low and high PEU sub-samples. A significant R 2 difference between the two sub-samples would offer evidence for not rejecting hypothesis H2. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, theoretical ranges, and actual ranges for all measured variables in the study while Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the same set of variables. 7 A review of the correlation values between the various independent variables shows some degree of statistical significance; however, more than one-half of them are weakly related (< 0.50) and none of them are strongly related (> 0.80). Williams and Seaman (2010) explained that these generally weak correlations overall are not unexpected because the independent variables are sub-dimensions of a larger single construct representing corporate governance. The behavioral literature (Perrow, 1970; Brownell, 1982; Daft, 1983) maintains that this phenomenon is not unusual in empirical social science research. Also, Table 3 reveals that the moderating variable, PEU, is virtually uncorrelated with the set of independent variables, with only one instance of a very weak relationship (P4). Finally, Table 3 indicates that PEU is correlated with the dependent variable, EC, which is an important property in regression analysis (Shields and Shields, 1998). 
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 251
The Clute Institute Table 4 reports the results of the regression analyses. Hypothesis H1 contends that the independent governance variables, from both the performance and conformance dimensions, will have a positive effect on the organization's ethical climate. The results of Eq. (1) presented in column 2 confirm a significant relationship (adjusted R 2 = 0.380; F = 17.936; p < 0.010) and, therefore, provide substantial support for hypothesis H1. 8 For the performance dimension of governance, variables P1 and P3 are significantly and positively associated with the dependent variable, EC, while P1 is marginally negative and not statistically significant. Turning to the conformance dimension, variable C2 is significantly and positively associated with EC whereas the risk variable, C3, surprisingly, is significantly negative. Finally, the accountability variable, C1, is not associated with EC. Overall, the findings are largely in the direction anticipated. Hypothesis H2 states that the relationship between the corporate governance variables and ethical climate will be stronger under low levels of PEU as opposed to high levels. Eq. (1), therefore, was re-estimated for each of the two sub-samples and the results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 . 9 When the level of PEU is low, there is a significant relationship between the corporate governance variables and ethical climate (adjusted R 2 = 0.443; F = 10.280; p < 0.010). As predicted, though, a significant, but weaker, relationship emerges when the level of PEU is high (adjusted R 2 = 0.361; F = 5.897; p < 0.010). To provide a direct test of hypothesis H2, the regression results from columns 3 and 4 were compared using the Chow test (Chow, 1960) to test for structural differences. The result revealed that the two regression equations were significantly different (F = 6.117; p < 0.010). This finding not only confirms the expected moderating effects of PEU differences on the corporate governance/ethical climate relationship, but it also provides strong evidence in support of hypothesis H2.
Regression Results
More specifically, the pattern of the independent variables is not consistent across the partial regression models when the two dimensions of corporate governance are contrasted. For the set of performance governance variables, there is virtually little change in the magnitude of the coefficients in the full regression model versus the Table 4 , that the corporate governance variables are important determinants of ethical climate and are influenced by the level of PEU.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
As acknowledged earlier, the nature of the relationship between corporate governance control mechanisms and ethical climate is elusive since there is no ready empirical evidence by which an assessment or comparison can be made, yet the literature acknowledges that an important aspect of corporate governance is creating and maintaining a positive ethical climate (Monks, 2002; IFAC, 2009; Elango et al., 2010) . The objective of this study, therefore, was to explore possible determinants of ethical climate at the organization level with measures derived from the conformance and performance governance characteristics put forth by the IFAC (2009). Findings from the full regression model indicate a strong overall relationship supported by the adjusted R 2 of 0.402 (F = 17.936; p < 0.001) reported in Table 4 and the corresponding significant correlations reported in Table 3 . The most important positive determinants of ethical climate are strategy (P1), value creation (P3), and assurance (C2) while risk (C3) operates inversely -meaning less risk enhances ethical climate. In addition, the communication variable (P2) and accountability variable (C1) are not important predictors of ethical climate for this sample. Nonetheless, both dimensions of corporate governance feature important determinates of ethical climate which, for the full model at least, should alleviate concerns advanced in a report by the IFAC (2008) indicating that organizations direct a disproportionate amount of attention to compliance mechanisms at the expense of performance mechanisms.
What is perhaps most striking in these outcomes for the conformance dimension is that the accountability (C1), assurance (C2), and risk (C3) variables do not function at all uniformly in their impact on the firm's ethical climate. More specifically, accountability has no effect, assurance has a strong positive effect, and risk has a strong negative effect on ethical climate. One possible explanation of the insignificant finding for accountability is that it reflects the prescriptive nature of strict adherence to an institutionalized professional code of conduct, standardized reporting requirements, and legal compliance with generally accepted accounting principles -routines that do not enhance perceptions of what is perceived to be correct behavior within the firm. This interpretation is consistent with definitions of ethical climate presented earlier and nicely phrased by Brief, Dukerich, Brown and Brett (1996, p. 193 ) who call it "the 'feel' of an organization … the perceptions of organizational members about how organizations function and/or what is important in their organizations."
The emergence of a significant negative effect for risk on ethical climate may not be so surprising, retrospectively, and certainly supports the decision to examine the moderating effects of uncertainty in the organization's external environment. Generically, risk is a variance between some potential, uncertain, event and the present status and this gives rise to the notion of certainty (no variance) and uncertainty. There is ample literature to suggest that ethical behavior is compromised when the proper actions to take are unknown (Shein, 1992; Dickson et al. (2001) . Williams and Seaman (2010, p. 10) made the point that "… practicing accountants at senior levels of the organization are probably involved with issues of risk, albeit indirectly rather than directly, thus limiting their ability to enlarge the network of risk processes and procedures." The findings in the present study support this reasoning, paradoxically, in that ethical climate is enhanced when less attention is devoted by the CFO to risk identification and the implementation of appropriate risk management systems. This is equivalent to endorsing less uncertainty as a means to enhancing the organization's ethical climate. Alternatively, it is possible that the risk measure adopted was simply too crude in the present study to discriminate between uncertainty in the firm's internal and external environments. Future research studies might consider incorporating Perrow's (1967) construct of technology (i.e., task difficulty and task variety) as a moderating variable to ascertain how the uncertainty associated with the firm's work transformation process might impact ethical climate.
Turning to the performance dimension of governance, both the strategy (P1) and value creation (P3) The significant relationship between the governance variables and ethical climate persists across both levels of PEU as reflected by the adjusted R 2 of 0.443 (F = 10.280; p < 0.001) and R 2 of 0.361 (F = 5.897; p < 0.001) reported in Table 4 , respectively. Hypothesis H2 posits a significantly stronger relationship under the condition of low PEU versus high PEU. The Chow test F-statistic for testing structural change between the two regressions confirmed the significance of the 22.7 percent increase in adjusted R 2 (i.e., (0.443 -0.361)/0.361) for the low PEU sub-sample over the high PEU sub-sample, thus providing strong statistical support for H2. Two further salient features appear in Table 4 . First, the rank order of the regression coefficients for the independent variables in terms of their magnitude is isomorphic across the reduced models for PEU (i.e., column 3 versus column 4), signaling the robustness of the independent governance variables and lending some theoretical support to their selection in the present model. Second, what does change dramatically, however, is the emergence of the value creation variable, P3, as the only significant variable in the high PEU sub-sample. With the marginal exception of the strategy variable, P1, the regression coefficients in the low PEU sub-sample are remarkably similar in importance (i.e., magnitude) as compared to the full sample. Given the prominent role of PEU observed in this study, it seems appropriate to explore its influence with refined measures on samples that control for location, industry, manufacturing versus service sectors, size, organization structure, and perhaps public versus private ownership, since the concept of environmental uncertainty is equivocal at best and possibly contingent on some or all of these factors.
In closing, the empirical results of this exploratory study reveal correlates of ethical climate that are congruent with the conformance and performance dimensions of corporate governance prescribed by the IFAC (2009). Equally important, results from the reduced models show that uncertainty in the external environment substantially weakens this relationship relative to conditions of more certainty. Given the salient role of PEU observed in this study, more empirical work is necessary to understand the types of control systems that could enhance ethical climate in turbulent and diverse environments, including, of course, appropriate refinements to the dependent and independent variables. Clearly, the generalizability of these results is indeterminate and calls for further studies with larger samples. Other limitations of this study are worth noting, including common-method bias from self-reported data (Kren, 1992) which could bias the model relationships, and the inability to ascertain nonresponse bias as a result of obtaining survey data from the Internet. The number of filters deployed to create the sample was very restrictive and produced a sample size that was not as large as desired. Furthermore, restricting the respondents to accounting-based positions in the firm assumed that they had requisite knowledge that was equal, or superior, to other functional managers or executives in the firm.
Future research studies can strive to circumvent these difficulties and perhaps examine other stakeholders as well, including divisions within the firm, cross-industry, or cross-cultural effects. These caveats notwithstanding, the findings challenge the view that "… the professional bodies are best placed to promote ethical behavior in the workplace via membership and ongoing educational development of members" (Jackling, et al., 2007, p.940) . It would seem that governance structures incorporating control systems that embrace an organization's ethical climate, patently endorsed by CFO leadership, also have a place in promoting ethical behavior. As Grojean et al. (2004, p. 225) frame it: "… it is the organization's leaders that enact the goal, policies, and practices … and thus play the primary role in the creation of climates related to ethics."
1.
The IFAC is used as the institutional referent by default in this study for two major reasons. First, its membership is truly global -with more than 163 member organizations in over 120 countries (Jackling Initially, items representing environmental turbulence and technology were incorporated into the pilot study, but the responses indicated virtually no variance. Discussions with respondents in the pilot study questioned the relevance of these items to nurturing an ethical climate in the firm. Consequently, these items were discarded from further analysis. 6.
A mean-split was utilized for parsimonious reasons in an effort to preserve as large a data set as possible, even though the two categories of low and high PEU were not equal in sample size. A median-split was rejected because of confounding effects in the two categories; that is, PEU responses with the same value in each category would nullify any conclusions of moderating effects on the relationship under study. 7.
Parametric statistical tests are potentially problematic with survey data. Hence, a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was applied to both the dependent and independent variables to ascertain univariate normality. The z-statistics were not significant and, thus, the null hypothesis that the sample was drawn from a normal population could not be rejected at a significance level of p < 0.10. 8.
To ensure the absence of multi-collinearity in the full regression model, a Variance Inflation Factor was calculated. The VIF was slightly above 1, well within acceptable limits. 9.
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated for each sub-sample and no significant differences were observed. In addition, each sub-sample was checked for univariate normality using the KolmogorovSmirnov z-statistic while the Mahalanobis multivariate test was applied to each regression. No abnormalities were found in either case.
